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Abstract
A key problem in Tor’s architecture is that it requires
users to maintain a global view of the system, which
will become costly as the size of the network increases.
Several peer-to-peer approaches have been proposed in
order to alleviate the scalability concerns of the Tor net-
work, but they are only able to provide heuristic security;
in fact, the security community has been quite success-
ful at breaking the state of the art systems using both
passive and active attacks. In this paper, we explore
new primitives for scalable anonymous communication,
with a focus on providing provable security guarantees.
First, we propose a new approach for secure peer-to-
peer anonymous communication based on a reciprocal
neighbor policy. Secondly, we propose PIR-Tor, a client-
server scalable architecture for anonymous communica-
tions based on Private Information Retrieval.
1 Introduction
In this era of pervasive surveillance, our online activ-
ities are recorded, aggregated, and analyzed. Anony-
mous communication is a basic privacy enhancing tech-
nology that hides the identity of communicating partners
from third parties, or user identity from the remote party.
The Tor network [7] is a deployed system for anony-
mous communication that serves hundreds of thousands
of users [12]. Tor is used to protect the privacy of journal-
ists, dissidents, whistle-blowers, law-enforcement and
even government embassies [10].
A key problem in Tor’s architecture is that it requires
users to maintain a global view of the system in order
to allow them to randomly choose relays. As the size
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of the network increases, maintaining a global view of
the system becomes costly. McLachlan et al. [13] show
that in the near future, the Tor network could be spending
an order of magnitude more bandwidth maintaining this
global view than relaying anonymous communication.
In order to alleviate the scalability concerns of the Tor
network, several peer-to-peer approaches have been pro-
posed [13, 17, 15, 19, 20, 23]. However, all of the pro-
posed peer-to-peer approaches only provide heuristic se-
curity; in fact, the security community has been quite
successful at breaking the state of the art systems using
both passive and active attacks [1, 4, 6, 16, 26]. More-
over, these systems are quite complex, and are limited
in their applicability as they only work with structured
topologies. In this paper, we explore new primitives
for scalable anonymous communication, with a focus on
providing provable security guarantees.
First, we propose a new approach for peer-to-peer
anonymous communication based on reciprocal neigh-
bor policy, that works even with unstructured topologies.
Our key insight is to entangle the fingertables of neigh-
boring nodes in the topology, i.e., if a malicious node X
tries to exclude an honest node Y from its fingertable,
then the honest node Y will also exclude the malicious
node X from its fingertable. We formally prove that a re-
ciprocal neighbor policy does not give any advantage to
the adversary.We also outline mechanisms for securing
the reciprocal neighbor policy itself, for both unstruc-
tured and structured topologies.
Secondly, we propose PIR-Tor, a client-server archi-
tecture for scalable anonymous communication that can
tolerate any fraction of compromised relays in the net-
work. Our main idea is to leverage private informa-
tion retrieval techniques (PIR) to query central directory
servers for a few random relays in the network. Query-
ing only a few nodes is the key to the scalability of our
architecture, while the use of PIR techniques safeguards
clients against passive attacks by malicious servers.
2 Background and Related Work
Tor [7] is a popular low-latency anonymous communica-
tion system, which serves hundreds of thousands of users
every day [12]. Each Tor client obtains a list of servers
from a central directory authority, and selects random re-
lays from the list to construct a circuit for onion routing
[24]. Tor requires each client to maintain a global view
of all the servers. However, as the number of servers
increases, maintaining a global view of the system be-
come costly, since churn will cause frequent updates
and a large bandwidth overhead. In fact, McLachan et
al. [13] show that in the near future, the Tor network
could be spending an order of magnitude more band-
width in maintaining a global view of the system, than
for relaying anonymous traffic.
Recent proposals to address the scalability concerns
in the Tor network advocate a peer-to-peer approach [23,
15, 19, 17, 13, 20]. However, the peer-to-peer setting
brings with it new challenges, including the ability to se-
curity locate random relays.
Morphmix [23] proposed to connect relays into a re-
stricted topology and construct circuits along paths in
this topology. In order to verify neighbor information
returned by intermediate nodes, MorphMix designed a
mechanism involving witness nodes and a collusion de-
tection mechanism. However, the collusion detection
mechanism can be circumvented by a set of colluding
adversaries who model the internal state of each node,
thus violating anonymity guarantees [25].
Later designs used distributed hash tables (DHT), also
known as structured peer-to-peer topologies, as a foun-
dation. Structured topologies assign neighbor relation-
ships using a pseudorandom but deterministic mathemat-
ical formula based on the IP addresses or public keys of
nodes. This allows the relationships to be verified exter-
nally, presenting fewer opportunities for attacks. Similar
to Morphmix, ShadowWalker [17] also uses a random
walk to locate relays, but the neighborhood information
returned by intermediate nodes is verified using redun-
dant structured topologies.
The design of Salsa [19] is similar to Tor, in that a
circuit is built by selecting three random nodes in the
network. Salsa uses a specially designed secure lookup
operation over a custom DHT to locate forwarder nodes.
The secure lookups use redundant checks to mitigate po-
tential attacks; these checks are able to limit the bias an
adversary can introduce in the lookup, but make Salsa
susceptible to information leak attacks: attackers can
detect a large fraction of lookups and thus infer the
path structure [16]. Salsa is also vulnerable to a se-
lective denial-of-service attack, where nodes break cir-
cuits that they cannot compromise [1, 26]. NISAN [20]
and Torsk [13] are recent designs that also use DHT
lookups to locate relays and include mechanisms to de-
fend against information leak attacks; however, weak-
nesses in both mechanisms were later identified [27].
AP3 [15] has a similar structure where paths are
built by selecting random relays using a secure lookup
mechanism [3]. The design of AP3 is more similar to
Crowds [22] than to Tor, with paths being formed by per-
forming a stochastic expected-length random walk. The
stochastic nature of AP3 makes it difficult for a rogue
node to decide whether its preceding hop is the initiator
or simply a relay in the path; however, for low-latency
communication, timing attacks may make this decision
simpler. Similar to Salsa, the secure lookup used in AP3
reveals a lot of information about the lookup initiator,
and makes the user vulnerable to passive information
leak attacks [16].
We note that all of the above approaches have focused
on verification of neighborhood information returned by
intermediate nodes. The mechanisms are complex, mak-
ing it hard to rigorously evaluate the user anonymity,
and invariably resulting in heuristic security guarantees;
in fact, the security community has been very success-
ful in breaking the state of the art P2P anonymity solu-
tions. Finally, fingertable verification based solutions are
only applicable to structured topologies, where neigh-
bor relationships are constructed based on a determin-
istic pseudo-random function. They do not work with
unstructured topologies like social network topologies,
which are a potentially useful substrate for anonymous
communication because edges between nodes represent
trust relationships.
Threat Model: Low-latency anonymous communica-
tion systems are not designed to resist a global adversary.
We consider a partial adversary who controls a fraction
f of all the nodes in the network. This set of malicious
nodes collude and can launch both passive and active at-
tacks. We consider the set of colluding nodes is static
and the adversary cannot compromise nodes at will.
Even in networks with large number of nodes, f can
be a significant fraction of the network size. Powerful
adversaries, such as governments or large organizations,
can potentially deploy enough nodes to gain a signifi-
cant fraction of the network. Similarly, botnets, whose
average size has grown in excess of 20 000 nodes [21],
present a real threat to anonymous systems.
3 Reciprocal Neighbor Policy
3.1 Protocol Description
We present a new primitive for scalable anonymous com-
munication, which we call reciprocal neighbor policy.
Our main idea is to consider bounded degree undirected
versions of structured or unstructured topologies, and
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Figure 1: Attack Model.
then entangle the fingertables of neighboring nodes with
each other, i.e., if a malicious node X does not adver-
tise an honest node Y in its fingertable, then Y also ex-
cludes X from its fingertable (tit-for-tat policy). Paths
for anonymous communication are constructed using a
random walk [17]. The initiator first sets up a circuit with
a random neighbor (finger) A, and then queries A for its
fingertable. Next, the initiator selects a random node B
from A’s fingertable and extends the circuit to B via A.
By iterating these steps, a circuit of arbitrary length can
be established. We can see that if a node attempts to bias
the random walk towards malicious nodes, then its own
probability of getting selected as an intermediate node
in the random walk reduces, nullifying the effect of the
attack.
Reciprocal neighborhood policy ensures that route
capture attacks on random walks serves to partially iso-
late malicious nodes behind a small cut in the topology,
reducing the probability that they will be selected in a
short random walk. Observe that our protocol requires
node degrees to be bounded, otherwise the adversary can
simply keep all honest nodes in its fingertable, in ad-
dition to inserting a large number of malicious nodes;
thereby increasing the probability that a malicious node
is selected in a random walk. We shall now show that
this tit-for-tat policy is surprisingly effective at mitigat-
ing active attacks on random walks, without increasing
the threat of passive attacks.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of this primitive, let
us assume for now that there is a mechanism to securely
achieve the reciprocal neighbor policy, i.e., that if a node
X does not advertise a node Y in its fingertable, then Y
also excludes X . We can model the security of the ran-
dom walk process as a Markov chain. Let us suppose that
there are n nodes in the network, with an average degree
of d, and that a fraction f of the nodes are malicious.
Also, suppose that the malicious nodes launch an active
route capture attack and try to exclude y nodes each from
their fingertables. We can classify the nodes into two re-
gions, the honest set of nodes (denoted by h), and the ma-
licious set of nodes (denoted by m). If the random walk
is in the regionm, then the probability of the next hop be-
ing honest is given by Pmh = d−df−yd . Pmm can be sim-
ply computed as 1− Pmh. Similarly, if the random walk
is in the region h, then the probability of the next hop
being honest is given by Phh =
(1−f)2·d
(1−f)2·d+f ·(1−f)·d−fy .
Again, Phm can be computed as 1 − Phh. The Markov
chain with the associated transition probabilities is illus-
trated in Figure 1. We can now compute the probability
of the l’th hop of a random walk being honest (denoted
by P (l)) as follows:
P (l) = P (l − 1) · Phh + (1− P (l − 1)) · Pmh
when l >= 1. The terminating condition for the re-
cursion is P (0) = 1, which reflects that the initiator is
honest. ∗ Figure 2 depicts the probability of l’th hop of
a random walk being malicious for n = 100 000, d =
20, y = 10. We can see that for small values of l, the
route capture attack reduces the probability of a mali-
cious being sampled in the random walk, but as the ran-
dom walk length increases, the probability of a malicious
node being sampled also increases (using the optimal at-
tack strategy). However, even when the length of the ran-
dom walk is l = 6, the probability of a malicious node
being sampled is only slightly greater than f , using an
optimal attack strategy. Note that in order to compro-
mise user anonymity using end-to-end timing analysis,
both the first and the last hops in the random walk must
be malicious. When the fraction of compromised nodes
is 0.2, and using an attack strategy y = 8 (which max-
imizes 6’th hop sampling bias), the probability of end-
to-end timing analysis is only 0.023, which is smaller
than the probability of end-to-end compromise without
any route capture attack (0.04, using y = 0). Thus we
conclude that reciprocal neighbor policy nullifies any ad-
versarial advantage for short random walks.
3.2 Securing Reciprocal Neighbor Policy
Unstructured Topologies: In this work, we consider
constant degree unstructured topologies, for example, we
can consider a constant degree version of social network
topologies by only admitting users who have a thresh-
old t number of friends, and then selecting any random
t edges from their friend list. Our main idea in this pro-
tocol is to have a trusted server issue one signature per
time slot on each node’s fingertable. This ensures that
nodes can only advertise a single fingertable within the
duration of any timeslot, but can update their fingerta-
bles across timeslots to handle node churn. Note that the
server signature is blind and the server does not verify
any information in the message. In particular, nodes are
free to advertise any neighborhood information in their
fingertable. The use of a trusted server ensures that there
is a single fingertable advertisement per time slot. This
∗For users who do not participate in the network, choosing an hon-
est first hop is critical, as is the case with guard nodes in Tor.
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Figure 2: Probability of l’th hop being compromised (Sampling Bias): (a) l = 1, (b) l = 2, (c) l = 3, (d) l = 4, (e)
l = 5, and (f) l = 6. Note that sampling bias is small. Moreover, attack strategies that increase sampling bias at higher
random walk lengths reduce sampling bias for smaller random walk lengths. However, for end-to-end timing analysis,
both first and last hops of the random walk must be compromised. Thus, reciprocal neighbor policy successfully
mitigates the route capture attack.
guarantees secure reciprocal neighbor policy because a
malicious node X cannot tell node Y that it is included
in X’s certificate, while giving another certificate that
does not include Y during the random walk process. If
there are n relays in the network, the trusted server will
have to issue n signatures per time slot, which could be
computationally expensive. We propose the following
approach to further improve the scalability of our de-
sign. First, all nodes send a hash of their routing state to
the trusted server. Next, the server constructs a Merkle
hash tree [14] over these messages, and signs the root
of the tree. Finally, the server sends its signature on the
root of the tree, along with the associated log n hashes
to each node, that allow a node to prove that its fin-
gertable was part of the Merkle tree signed by the trusted
server. The computational overhead of this approach is
only n logn hash operations per time slot, and the band-
width overhead is also only O(n logn) (as compared to
O(n2) overhead in the current Tor architecture). Ran-
dom walks on social networks are Sybil resilient [28, 5];
our solution to mitigate route capture attacks in social
networks makes its use even more attractive.
Structured Topologies: While the above protocol is
the only current proposal for mitigating route capture in
unstructured topologies, it still requires the involvement
of a trusted central server. Next, we propose a proto-
col tailored for structured topologies, where we use the
structure of the topology to enforce security properties
and reduce the involvement of trusted entities. Namely,
we assume that there exists some sort of public key in-
frastructure (PKI) that is used to verifiably assign iden-
tifiers to Tor routers, but no online interaction with a
trusted party is necessary.
Our main idea is to associate each node with a certifi-
cate, that is signed by its fingers. This certificate contains
a list of the node’s fingers. The key property that we
need to impose on this certificate is that a node should
be able to produce only a single certificate per time slot
that is globally verifiable. The global verifiability will
ensure that neighbors can check this certificate and de-
cide whether to include it in their own fingertable, and
any node in the network can also check the certificate to
secure the random walk process. A single verifiable cer-
tificate per time slot ensures that a node X cannot tell
node Y that it is included in X’s certificate, while giv-
ing another certificate that does not include Y during the
random walk process.
We use distance checking [3, 20] to ensure a certifi-
cate uniqueness per time slot. To verify a certificate,
nodes compute the average distance between optimal fin-
gers based on the structure of the topology and the fin-
gers listed on the certificate. If this distance is greater
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than a threshold, then the certificate is rejected. It has
been shown in [3, 20] that distance checking has low
false positives, but admits a few false negatives β, which
means that an adversary will be able to replace a few hon-
est nodes (β) in its fingertable by malicious nodes (as-
suming uniform distribution of node identifiers). Thus, if
the distance check succeeds, then there are at most β+df
malicious nodes in the fingertable, where d is the average
node degree. Consequently, the remaining d(1− f)− β
nodes are honest. In addition to the identifiers of the fin-
gers, the certificate also consists of signatures from the
fingers. We assume that honest nodes only give a single
signature to a node per time slot. Thus, in order to pro-
duce two differing certificates per time slot that pass the
distance checking test, the malicious node requires sig-
natures from at least 2 · (d(1− f)− β) fingers. It is easy
to show that this is not possible as long as f ≤ 1− 2βd .
4 PIR-Tor
Securing anonymous communications peer-to-peer net-
works is very challenging. In order to guarantee ran-
dom choice of nodes as communications relays, secure
designs are built upon the assumption that the node iden-
tifiers are distributed uniformly at random in the identi-
fier space, and that the fraction of malicious nodes in the
network is less than 20%. The Tor network currently has
only about 2500 relays, and if they were to be arranged
in a peer-to-peer fashion today, it may not be too diffi-
cult for an adversary to compromise or operate more than
500 malicious nodes to cross the 20% threshold [18]. We
propose a new client-server architecture called PIR-Tor,
that is able to tolerate as many compromised relays as the
current Tor network, while allowing the network to scale
up to ten times its current size.
Our main insight in this architecture is that users do
not need to request a complete list of available relays in
the network from central directory servers; users only
need a few random relays to build circuits. However,
having knowledge of only a few relays in the network
makes the users vulnerable to passive route fingerprint-
ing attacks [4] from malicious directory servers even un-
der the honest-but-curious model, which is the current
threat model in Tor as well as other extensions [13]. We
note that malicious servers are a real threat: recently, a
Tor directory server was found to be compromised.
In PIR-Tor, we propose to leverage private informa-
tion retrieval to solve the scalability problem of the Tor
network. Central servers would host a database con-
taining the IP addresses of all available Tor routers, and
clients could obtain relays by querying this database us-
ing private information retrieval repeated times (as many
as the length of the circuit, three in the currently de-
ployed Tor network). This reduces the bandwidth over-
head, while protecting clients privacy from adversarial
directory servers. Such an approach has the added advan-
tages of requiring minimal changes to the Tor protocol in
addition to providing provable security guarantees.
In the Tor network, clients do not choose the routers
fully at random but subject to several constraints. For
example, the first relay must be a guard node (i.e., a
stable node that has been online a significant amount of
time), while the last relay must be an exit node. PIR-Tor
can accommodate this requirement by adding to each en-
try in the database the router’s policies and uptimes, but
this would increase the average number of times that the
database has to be queried until the IP of three suitable
nodes are found. To alleviate this problem, we propose
to separate the central servers in three categories, such
that each category contains only IPs of guard nodes, exit
nodes or middle nodes, respectively. We note that, as
nodes can belong to more than one category, it could be
necessary to perform some extra queries to avoid node
repetitions in the paths. Nevertheless, as these databases
now contain fewer nodes than in the general case ex-
plained above, the total time to obtain three IP addresses
is on average smaller. Furthermore, although this strat-
egy seems to reduce the anonymity sets of the nodes cho-
sen by a client, it is equivalent to the current Tor mecha-
nism as nowadays the node’s role is public, i.e., it already
appears in the list stored by the current directories.
A second restriction is that guard nodes are fixed for
each client. This can be easily achieved in PIR-Tor, by
having the client request always the same IP (i.e., the
same index) from the database. Finally, relays are not
chosen randomly, but in proportion to a node’s band-
width. PIR-Tor can satisfy this requirement by sorting
the database in increasing order of bandwidth, and then
having the client pick an index to query in a bandwidth-
weighted fashion.†
Evaluation: We now evaluate the performance of
PIR-Tor through simulations. We choose the Kushilevitz
and Ostrovsky [11] computational Private Information
Retrieval scheme, based on the Goldwasser and Micali
homomorphic encryption scheme [9] with a key length
of 1024 bits. We use the Java implementation by Bortz
and Inguva [2] and run our experiments on an Intel Core2
Duo T5600 at 1.83GHz, and 3 GB of RAM.
In the current Tor network clients use three-hop paths
to rely their messages. For this purpose, they regularly
download a list of the currently available Tor routers
from one of the central directories, and select at ran-
dom three of them to construct a circuit. In PIR-Tor,
clients query the server three times with random indexes,
to retrieve three IP addresses. Table 1 shows the time
†The clients would need to learn overall distribution of bandwidth in
the network, but this information need not be exact and can be updated
infrequently.
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Table 1: Time to obtain one IP address from the database
(in milliseconds)
Nodes 1500 2500 5000 10000 15000 20000
CPIR 2.3 2.9 4.2 6.0 7.2 7.9
needed to retrieve one IP address from the server de-
pending on the number of available routers (the numbers
show the average over 100 000 queries and do not take
into account network delays). We assume the server has
a database of IP addresses, i.e., each of the entries has 32
bytes. The current Tor network counts on approximately
2 500 nodes. Using CPIR, a client needs 2.9 milliseconds
to obtain one IP address, thus only 9 milliseconds are
necessary to obtain three routers to form a circuit. Even if
the network grows up to 20 000 nodes only 7.9 millisec-
onds per query are needed (24 milliseconds to construct
a path). Thus, a single server can support 25, 000 clients
building a single circuit every 10 minutes. Further im-
provements in scalability can be achieved by replicating
the server.
Another promising approach to implement PIR-Tor is
using information theoretic PIR [8]. In this protocol mul-
tiple servers hold a copy of the database, and the client
queries all of them to retrieve information. A t-private
l-server PIR is a PIR system in which the privacy of the
query is information theoretically protected, even if up to
t of the l servers collude.
5 Conclusion
Tor [7] requires users to select routers at random in or-
der to provide anonymity. For this purpose users must
maintain a global view of the system. It has been shown
that, if the Tor network continues growing at the same
rate [12] this approach will be soon impracticable [13].
In this paper we have proposed two alternative archi-
tectures that solve this problem. The first one is a peer-
to-peer architecture, in which the appearance of nodes in
each other fingertables is reciprocal, and we demonstrate
how this mechanism allows for better random sampling
of nodes than previous proposals, substantially reducing
the probability of route capture.
Our second contribution is PIR-Tor, a centralized ar-
chitecture that leverages Private Information Retrieval to
suppress the need for global knowledge of the system.
Although this solution trades off bandwidth for compu-
tation, we prove through simulations that the latter is
within reach of off-the-shelf computers.
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